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metrical ear is interestingly shown in the Harley scribe's objection to Chaucer's nine-syllabled lines; he revises them in over 40 cases where they are retained by the eleven other MSS used in this part of the comparison. It is also remarkable that three-quarters of these Harleian corrections are in the first third of the poem; this fact strikes the present reviewer as the more curious because in the *Parlement of Foules* the manuscripts cease to diverge from one another after the first third of the poem. Is it to be expected that revisers, be they authors or correctors, will work with vigor for just about that much of a known task?

The paper leaves us expectant, and with food for speculation. If the long-admired Harley 7334 be denied any share in the establishment of the Chaucerian text, or "used, if at all, only with the greatest suspicion", if the Ellesmere and its allies are to "lie under strong suspicion of having been re-edited by another than Chaucer", if the Gg scribe is to be regarded with even more distrust than the Harley copyist—whither go we for our text of Chaucer? The only large class of manuscripts remaining is that burdened with spurious additions to its Links and distorted by false arrangement. Will it ultimately appear that this class, which it has been suggested is the eldest in its type and perhaps "pirated" without the poet's knowledge, contains a text of the *Tales* more nearly truthful in intention than is the work of intelligent revisers a decade later?

ELEANOR PRESCOTT HAMMOND.

THE ETERNAL VALUES. By Hugo Münsterberg. Boston and New York. Houghton Mifflin Co. 1909. \$2.50 net. Pp. XV, 436.

This work is a translation and revision of the same author's 'Philosophie der Werte', its general point of view is already partially revealed in his 'Psychology and Life' and other works, and his treatment of esthetic values is foreshadowed in his 'Principles of Art Education'.

The book presents a system of philosophy in terms of value rather than of the real or the true in the narrower sense. Further, its point of view is that of absolutism, idealism, and voluntarism. It opposes all pragmatism, naturalism, scepticism and relativistic philosophy.

Values are grounded in the active, dynamic aspect of our nature, which is regarded as the essential factor in all experience. *The will creates values* as necessary postulates. The author is not interested, save as a critic, in relative or empirical

values. Such are values that spring from mere desires or personal volitions or that are exhausted in personal pleasures and satisfactions. If society is viewed naturalistically, it is a mere aggregate of individuals, hence social demands and sanctions are no better basis than the individual ones. The only valid basis of any real or pure value is the *over-personal will*, which with its values is not to be derived by any empirical induction from particular finite needs and tendencies.¹ Such a pure will act must have its purposes and content, but its realization consists, not in any single element like the particular deed, pleasure, gratification of instinct, or external result; it consists rather in the relation of identity between aim and result. It is this universal, the essence and product of will as a relating activity that demands and posits a unitary world, it is this and this alone that gives meaning and value to every thing, occurrence, relation or system, to all that is experienceable.² Yet the author argues that the values *do not depend upon obligation*. To be sure, they are ideals rather than facts, they are our tasks rather than fixed realities; yet they involve no external demand,—in conforming to norms of thought, taste, or conduct we are autonomous, satisfying the own will. But as with Kant, this will is still supersensible and is not in the least concerned with the satisfaction of any finite or personal need.

This highly systematic treatise, after the manner of German idealism from Kant to Hegel, *classifies values* on the basis of four forms of the fundamental relation of *identity* at which the value-seeking will always aims. This yields the logical, esthetic, ethical, and metaphysical values as the highest types. Each of these is subdivided according as the will act that is its ground is naive and unreflective or controlled by conscious purpose. A further division is found in the direction of valuation to three fields: the external world of things, the fellow world of persons, and the inner world of valuations. In all, therefore, there are twenty-four presumably distinct types of value.

The writer makes much of the concept of *immediate experience*, that pure, original source from which our naive and indirectly our cultured valuations spring.³ It contains the fundamental difference of self and its contents, or will and its

¹ Yet the critic finds the over-personal will conceived entirely by methods of analogy and appreciation, starting from the personal will.

² Thus early the untenable dualism of the absolute and the finite, of the real and the phenomenal, seems complete, reminding one of Kant; so that the question, whose will this is, would be an absurd question.

³ It is apparently personal experience, which suggests the problem as to how eternal values are derivable from it.

object. These contents are phenomena in space and time and viewed as means or end of the self. But the distinction between the mental and the physical is not found in such experience; it is an artifact of science—for pure experience all is alive and conscious and extended.⁴

The *metaphysical values* are thus accounted for: the logical, esthetic and ethical values constitute three distinct worlds because the valuations start with different purposes or points of view. The author aims at precise definition of these values and tries to ensure their complete independence and mutual exclusiveness; yet they are often found to be antagonistic. But that is unsatisfactory to an experience whose essence is will and whose will-object is a unitary world or a system of relations of identity. They must be combined without being confounded, but no one of the three values can be made the supreme and unifying one, for all equally had their origin in immediate experience and on account of their very nature each could rightly protest against permanent subordination of this kind. So religion and metaphysics are viewed as the superior valuations, the one naive and the other cultured; the one effecting an emotional, the other a more intellectual unification; 'religion transcends experience', 'philosophy goes back to the presuppositions of experience'. Yet the essence of both is *conviction*, the supreme belief,—ostensibly an over-personal act.⁵

⁴ This reveals the fact that the esthetic and the ethical values, so far as they exclude scientific intelligence, are nearer the original, underlying reality than is science; but it is doubtful to the reader how far purposeful valuations, especially achievement, can exclude science, while the writer's position does not make it clear that the original form of experience is any more valuable or real than those highly purposeful, intelligent, and controlled forms which eventuate in philosophy. Indeed there is a doubtful consistency in the appeal to either analytic or genetic origins on the part of one who scorns evolutionary philosophy and would divorce ideals and values from their biological or sociological explanation. But the important application of the author's view is that *the scientific account is not philosophy*, it is only one type of value primarily different from the others and not at all their superior. Artists and reformers, cheer up! The dominion of science is limited.

⁵ But the critic would say that both philosophy and religion, while aiming to be over-personal, always have their roots in the personal, without which they must lack vigor and applicability to human needs. But philosophy, even the philosophy of values, is to be nothing if not inapplicable!

⁶ The author's portrayal of the Absolute or *overself* has little to distinguish it from that of other dynamic idealists. To the reviewer, the noticeable fact is the failure of the concept to satisfy the needs

In his account of *esthetic values*, Münsterberg rejects the metaphysical method (which is deductive from extra-experiential assumptions), as well as the scientific method, whether of psychology (whose problems are with the constitution and causal relations of the mental processes concerned) or of physics (which describes and explains the object). He would use the critical method, which goes back to the presuppositions common to these sciences and to art, i. e. back to immediate experience. Thus theories of association, of *Einfühlung*, and of inner imitation may apparently be brushed aside. The appreciation of the beautiful does not really involve the projection into the object of *my* feeling or of a unity which belongs to my apperceiving mind rather than to the object, as current psychology would make out. No, in immediate experience, whose characteristics both naive and cultured appreciation share, the object is not a thing but a source of will, and it is beautiful because it suggests to us the harmony of its own volitions.⁷ The esthetic object involves a manifold of will tendencies in inherent agreement or mutual support, and separated from the rest of the world.

The central characteristic of the esthetic object is its *isolation*, which implies its practical and scientific *unreality*. In the narrow sense it does not exist, tho it is the deepest meaning of life and the world. Its place is in the world of imagination. It arouses no expectations referring beyond itself. Strictly, it represents nothing real; every art has its illusion-destroying factors (e. g. the stage, the frame) which inhibit one's expectations of real connections and developments. A definite, particular place in the web of our practical and scientific interests is denied to it so far as it remains esthetic.⁸

that gave rise to it; failure, first, to attain inner consistency in the conception, and second, to frame it so that it shall have any vital, appreciable, and controlling relations to finite experience. It is either an empty, abstract universal instead of the organizing principle it purports to be, or its contents are human qualities carried over into eternity with the tatters of their finitude still clinging to them

⁷ Here it is not quite clear whether the over-personal will at the foundation of all esthetic value has its temporal shrine in the appreciator, in the object, or in a relation between the two.

⁸ Yet (as I should argue) the esthetic object has a rich meaning which always involves transcendence of the merely presented; tho its outer relations are cut off, it has complexity, and its own world, without one's stepping from imagination to reality, involves causal, moral,

Art, then, does not aim to portray real things, it is unfettered by natural and historical connections; thru its ideality it eliminates the self-referring attitudes of the observer, thus bringing into strong relief the will or meaning inherent in its own content; it has a totality dependent on identity of purpose rather than on causal connection; it is able to transform what is naturally ugly into the beautiful; and it has a unique form, a structure peculiar to it as art. All these factors of the art work are combined and interdependent.

While Münsterberg isolates the esthetic much more sharply than would be agreeable to many current writers, on the other hand he conceives the field more broadly than is customary. As it were, having adopted a telescope that strictly confines the vision, he then turns it in novel directions. There are *three classes of naive esthetic values*: harmony, love, and happiness, belonging respectively to the outer world, the fellow world, and the inner world. They are to be sharply distinguished from the pleasant effects caused by nature or fellowship: the value of love is not the pleasure of either person, but the validity of the relation between them. But the over-personal will is capable of combination with personal desire or aversion so that the object may be at once beautiful and agreeable or even disagreeable.

Natural beauty involves the immediate expression of the intrinsic will agreement in nature. Its meaning cannot be revealed in any abstract conception, whether moral, scientific, or metaphysical; nor is it interpreted as mutual adjustment of parts in a mechanical system, which is a purely external unity. Love is the harmony of persons, not of biological objects. There is some difficulty in distinguishing love and happiness from moral values, but the writer apparently has in mind mainly the immediate forms of the experience: love as instinctive or impulsive or as an assured attainment, however effortful its preconditions; and happiness as a spontaneous attitude. Again, the emphasis is not on *being* happy or a friend but on appreciating the harmony of wills involved therein; tho it is admitted that the best appreciator is the participant. The content of happiness is viewed as decidedly a dynamic process: work "is an unfailing source of happiness", "such a moving equilibrium of

and other relations. Further, the art work is immensely suggestive, big with human meaning; and tho its explicit connections with real or practical life may be cut off, implicit half-hidden ones, like the nervous connections of a one-legged man with the lost member, can hardly be denied it. Its isolation from the rest of life thus resembles the isolation of play.

the inner world is the highest happiness", "hence the inexhaustible content of happiness in truth and beauty and morality".

The writer's *classification of the arts* is an interesting example of the influence of a general schema, deductively applied, in modifying commonly accepted views and to some extent in distorting the facts and the genuine meanings involved. First, when isolation from the practical and the real is incomplete, as in landscape gardening, architecture, dancing, esthetic value is either lacking or of low degree.¹⁰ Next, the fine arts (pictures and sculpture) have as their content nature, literature deals with the fellow world, and music with the inner world of emotions and evaluations. According to this, the fine arts are concerned with men never as persons capable of a variety of will attitudes in different relations, but only as static will points in nature; and the author argues that literature never appreciates nature as such with its own will agreement, but only nature in relation to man, as influencing or reflecting human purposes.¹¹ As for the subdivisions of literature, the epic deals with the hero in relation to nature, the drama with the hero in the fellow world, the lyric with his inner world. In the epic all actors beside the hero (or at most the '*heroic pair*'!) are subordinated and embedded in the natural background, which is not the case in the drama.¹² Other classes of literature are not mentioned, nor is the distinction between poetry and prose.

We can barely mention a few further details. *Pictorial form* involves the unity or agreement of lines, unity of colors,

⁹ Thus it is not quite clear that love and happiness, as esthetic values, are isolated from the context of the rest of life; nor is the logical relation adequately worked out between these experiences as possible moral ideals and duties and as esthetic values. The author's theory of extreme isolation, here as elsewhere, breaks down, and a golden opportunity is lost for working out a true and significant theory of the vital, intrinsic (not metaphysical) connection of the esthetic with other values.

¹⁰ With this should be contrasted the views of Santayana, Wm. Morris, and Vernon Lee that magnify the function of art in life and its relation to work and utility; also Münsterberg's own appreciation of happiness.

¹¹ Whatever the provinces of the arts *ought* to be, evidently they are in practice not wholly as here outlined. This is quite as evident of the interpretation given to subdivisions of literature.

¹² As to the lyric, the critic would fain know (and the question holds for the whole esthetic field) whether its esthetic value depends on its expression of over-personal feelings only and not at all of personal feelings?

unity of lights, the unity of these different form factors, and finally the unity of form and content; and in each instance this means a unity of wills or tendencies inherent in the object. The essence of the *drama* is "the sharp antithesis of opposing wills", yet "the true drama does not leave any dissonance", for the observer implicitly wills just such collisions. The drama "holds us in the spell of participation and sympathy, and forces us to will with all the parties". Thus a genuine, tho an unselfish and over-personal sympathy is evoked in the observer. Again, *meaning* is not something distinct from words, it is not dependent on associated imagery but is an implicit phase of the word experience itself. Finally, the direct content of *music* is not physical or mental sounds in the abstract, but living tones in vital will relations, tones that possess and are sources of will and feeling; and music has not only a form but a meaning,—not an objective reference to things and events, nor to the feelings of composer, performer, or other men—not a definite conceptual meaning at all—but a meaning inherent in and confined to the world of tones or music, i. e. the inner world of the hearer; for music is not placed in the space world but is the essence of my world of esthetic values.

Wanting space for a thorough criticism, my estimate must perforce seem dogmatic. Great credit is due the author for his conscious purpose to think systematically, without which no fundamental philosophy is possible. The book also is frequently suggestive, to the general or the technical reader, of views important quite apart from the author's system. Further, it has an inspiring quality due to the magnitude of the undertaking, to the fundamental appeal to will, to the emphasis of the more than personal nature of the real values, i. e. to its ethical idealism.

Yet the candid examiner of the volume must recognize limitations inherent in the very nature of such a system and such inspiration. For there remain conflicting ideas and values where unity of concepts or values was sought; the eternal fixedness of such ideas and values appears out of appreciative and controlling touch with the variety and fluidity of life experience; the more abstract concepts seem empty and colorless save as meaning is infused into them out of the conditions of finite experience in a manner that is subtly opposed to the deductive apriori standpoint fundamental to absolutism; the dualism of the absolute and the relative, or of universal and particular, appears at many different points in the various fields of value, and appears as not really resolved by any one principle; or if the eternal nature of value be admitted as established, it remains a puzzle how there can be any genuine and ultimate differences of

value, especially differences of degree (this point, so significant for art, morality and common life, would be fruitful of discussion). So that one is brought face to face with the dilemma: Either value cannot be accounted for in this wise by any one principle of life, or if it is, the principle renders all differences of value and all valuable differences in life *nil*.

In the author's treatment of esthetic values, some of its commendable features are: the adoption of the philosophic viewpoint, the definiteness of this viewpoint, the excellent estimate of the relative importance of other methods in esthetics, the reaction on some of the current esthetic theories, the admitted breadth of the field of esthetic values, the evident basis of all in immediate experience, the deduction that all beauty is essentially spiritual (consisting in will agreements), and the suggestive treatment of the topics nature-beauty, love, and happiness.

On the other hand we have noticed the inadequate formalism in his classification of the arts, and the reviewer is compelled to take issue especially with his isolation of the esthetic. This is an extreme position liable to misapprehension and erroneous deductions, such as the total exclusion from the esthetic of all other values, the entire neglect of content for form, and the dogma of art for art's sake vs. for life's sake; and to such implications the author, tho confusedly, lends his sanction. Only on the basis of some other theory or by shifting the emphasis in this one could one speak of the extra-esthetic functions inherent in esthetic experience, or think of esthetic values as continuous with or containing or leading to social, practical, moral, religious, intellectual, and educational values.

Finally, if we ask about the value of philosophy and especially of a philosophy of values, with this particular treatise as our example, we may let the author speak in his own words and anti-pragmatist spirit: "We seek a truth which we conceive in our search as independent of its possible useful consequences". Tho it purports to express the highest meanings of life, it disclaims all intrinsic functions in relation to life. As literature and philosophy are thus portrayed in a certain remoteness from immediate life values, in spite of their derivation from the latter, can the *litterateur* expect to find in such philosophy satisfaction for any personal life needs or any purely literary interests? or does it satisfy any need except the pure will to speculation, which is not a *need* at all? I must leave the reader to answer these questions by turning to the volume itself, which at any rate contains a great deal that is interesting to different classes of men, including literary men.

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